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A growing number of regional economic integration arrange-
ments ("RIAs") have attracted many researchers on international
trade of various disciplines. Indeed, "[w]hen the WTO was estab-
lished on 1 January 1995, most Members were parties to at least
one regional agreement that had been notified to GATT."'
Moreover, of all the agreements that GATT has been given notice
of since 1948, thirty percent of them were signed between 1990-
942 and fifty-five 3percent of those currently in force were signed
between 1990-95. It is interesting to note that if we remove those
agreements that: i) are still in force, ii) involve more than two par-
ties (not bilateral), and iii) are presented as free trade areas or cus-
toms unions (not preferential trade arrangements ("PTA")), there
* MPA Candidate, 1998, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Har-
vard University; L.L.B., University of Tokyo, 1993. Official of Ministry of In-
ternational Trade and Industry, the Government of Japan. The views and
opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author and are not necessarily
the views of the Japanese government. The draft of the Article was prepared
for a seminar conducted by Professor Joel P. Trachtman at the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. I am grateful to Professor Tracht-
man for his illuminating comments, as well as the participants of the seminar.
All errors are mine.
1 1 World Trade Organization Annual Report 1996 38 (1997) [hereinafter
WTO Ann. Rep. 1996] (noting Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Japan
as notable exceptions).
I Out of 109 agreements, including those notified under the 1979 Enabling
Clause as well as GATT art. XXIV, 32 were signed between 1990-94. See
WORLD TRADE ORG., REGIONALISM AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 77-
89 ajpp. tbl.1 (1995) [hereinafter WTO].
Out of 88 agreements, 48 were signed between 1990-95. See WTO Ann.
Rep. 1996, supra note 1, at 40-42..
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are only about ten remaining,4 half of which are in the Western
Hemisphere.
The purpose of this Article is to develop a framework to ana-
lyze the institutional design of international economic organiza-
tions ("IEOs"), especially RIAs and to apply this framework to
analyze the impact of economic integration measures on their in-
stitutional development. This Article applies the theory of trans-
action costs to the analysis of IEOs.5 The initial questions posed
under this theory were: 1) why do IEOs exist; 2) why has one
super-IEO not emerled; and 3) why is the internal governance of
an IEO the way it is. This theory answers that since the solution
minimizing transaction costs is different between different IEOs,
or within one IEO at different points in time depending on the
surrounding environment, institutional arrangements may also be
different. This Article will compare several different IEOs and
will attempt to explain the unique features of each and the differ-
ences between them through this transaction cost theory.
This Article will also demonstrate the application of this the-
ory to predict the future institutional evolution of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"). Commentators pay less
attention to the regional economic integration effort of ASEAN
than the European Union ("EU") or the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), perhaps rightly so considering
their respective achievements so far. This Article suggests, how-
ever, that if we look carefully at the recent development of
ASEAN since the introduction of the ASEAN Free Trade Area
("AFTA"), we can find good reason to believe that this may lead
to a more conspicuous example of RIAs.
Section 2.1. of this Article briefly looks at the economic coop-
eration of ASEAN; the theory, framework, and methodology
' The remaining agreements are AFTA, the Andean Pact, CACM,
CARICOM, CEFTA, EFTA, EU, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. See WTO, su-
pra note 2, at 26, 77-89 tbl.1 & app. tbl.1. Also remaining are the Arab Com-
mon Market and COMESA. See WTO Ann. Rep. 1996, supra note 1, at 4041.
These sources give no description of COMESA, but in some respects it seems
something more than a PTA. See Richard Harmsen & Michael Leidy, Regional
Trading Arrangements, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES: THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND BEYOND, VOLUME 1 88, 108 app. 1 (1994).
5 For this analysis of TEOs, I rely primarily on Joel P. Trachtman,The The-
ory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: To-
ward C mparative Institutional Analysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 470
(1996/97)." See id. at 471-72.
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that underlies the analysis of this paper is developed in Sections
2.2. and 2.3. Section 3 compares the institutional designs of sev-
eral IEOs based on the theory and framework in the previous part
in section two. In Section 4, following a brief comparison of the
state of regional economic relations of several regions through sta-
tistical data, the findings of the preceding analysis are presented.
Section 4.3. demonstrates how the preceding discussions can be
applied to a prediction of the future institutional evolution of
ASEAN. Section 5 concludes.
2. BASICS
2.1. ASEANandAFTA: An Overview
ASEAN was established in 1967 with the ASEAN Declaration
(or Bangkok Declaration) by the five original members: Indone-
sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Shortly
thereafter, Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos, and Myanmar
(1997) joined.7
The original purpose declared upon its establishment sets
forth three broad groupings for ASEAN activities: political and
security, economic, and functional. It states that its purpose is "to
accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural de-
velopment.., to promote regional peace and stability... [and] to
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, sci-
entific and administrative fields."8
ASEAN's first decade was devoted to -olitical issues and made
little progress in economic cooperation. ASEAN Preferential
7 Cambodia was originally intended to be admitted at the same time as
Laos and Myanmar, but its admission was delayed due to political instability in
Cambodia. See Joint Press Statement, The Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, Aug. 11, 1997 (visited Feb. 13, 1998) <http:/www.aseansec.orgi/
news/pre cam1.htm>; Joint Statement, The Special Meeting of the ASEAN For-
eign Miniters, July 10, 1997 (visited Feb. 13, 1998) < http:/ww.aseansec.org/
news/pre cam.htm>.
8 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6
I.L.M. 1233 [hereinafter ASEAN Declaration].
9 See Sherry M. Stephenson, ASEANand the Multilateral Trading System, 25
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 439, 440 (1994); see also Narongchai Akrasanee &
David Stifel, The Political Economy of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, in AFTA:
THE WAY AHEAD 27, 28-29 (Pearl Imada & Seiji Naya eds., 1992).
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Trading Arrangements ("PTAs") were introduced in 1977,10 yet
they were too limited to have a significant impact on intra-
regional trade.
1
A significant step toward further economic integration was
taken in 1992 at the Summit Meeting in Singapore by the signing
of two principal economic agreements.12  One agreement is to
"establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area using the Common Effec-
tive Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme as the main mechanism
within a time frame of 15 years beginning 1 January 1993 with
the ultimate effective tariffs ranging from 0% to 5%."13 They later
decided to "further accelerate the progress towards the actualisa-
tion of AFTA before the target date of Year 2003."' 4 The other
agreement sets forth an extensive list of areas of cooperation, in-
cluding industry, finance, agriculture, transportation, and research
and development. 5 Since 1995, a series of agreements establishing
frameworks in respective sectors have been signed pertaining to
services,16 intellectual property cooperation, 17 investment,18 cus-
toms, 19 and finance. 20
10 See Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, Feb. 24,
1977 (visited Feb. 13, 1998) <http://www.aseansec.org/economic/agrpta77
.htm>.
1 See Stephenson, supra note 9, at 441.
12 These two agreements were the Agreement on the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),
Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 513 [hereinafter AFTA Agreement] and the Frame-
work Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Jan. 28, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 506 [hereinafter Economic Cooperation Agreement].
13 Singapore Declaration of 1992, Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 498 [hereinafter
Singapore Declaration].
14 Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995, Dec. 15, 1995,available in West-
law, 1EL Database.
15 See Economic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 2, 3.
16 See ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, Dec. 15, 1995,available
in Westlaw, IEL Database [hereinafter Services Agreement].
17 See ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation,
Dec. 15, 1995, (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.asean.or.id/economic/
eco ipr.htm> [hereinafter IPR Agreement].
-s See ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Dec. 15, 1987 (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.aseanec.ong/economic/
agrfin87.htm >.
19 See ASEAN Agreement on Customs, Mar. 1, 1997 (visited Jan. 16, 1998)
<http://www.aseanec.org/economic/custom97.htm> [hereinafter Customs
Agreement].
20 See Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Finance, Mar. 1,
1997 (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.aseanec.org/economic/
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2.2. A Theory of International Economic Integration:
Transaction Cost
Before looking at actual examples of RIAs, I will first articu-
late a theory providing a framework to analyze these RIAs in the
sections that follow.
2.2.1. The Basic Model
The theory of transaction costs was initially introduced by
Ronald Coase to answer the following questions about the busi-
ness firm: Why does it exist, and why is there not just one large
firm?21 In applying this theory to analyze IEOs, international re-
lations are analogized to a market where states interact to maxi-
mize their utility.22 The hypothesis here is that "states use and
design international institutions to maximize the members' net
gains IG) ... from engaging in intergovernmental transac-
tions.'o Net gains ("NG") equal total gains ("TG") from engag-
ing in intergovernmental transactions minus the sum of transac-
tion losses ("TL") from such transactions and transaction costs
("TC") of international relations. 24 Assuming that states enter the
market in order to gain from transactions, there can be no trans-
actions, cooperation, or integration without net gains from trans-
actions defined as (NG=TG-(TL+TC) > 0).25 Each of these com-
ponents will be described below.
2.2.2. Components
22.2.1. Transaction Gains
External effects caused by other states through, for example,
regulation that fails to protect foreign interests, strict regulation
that contains protectionist effects, or lax regulation that may be
viewed as a subsidy, may cause other states to limit these activi-
mufin97.htm > [hereinafter Finance Understanding]. Sometimes it is called a
convention-protocol system because substantive obligations are defined after
the framework is defined. See Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Flexible Free
Trade: The ASEANFree Trade Area, 34 HARV. INT'L LJ. 224, 224-25 (1993).
21 See Trachtman, supra note 5, at 471.
'2 See id. at 498.
' Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
24 See id. at 474.
's See id. at 489.
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ties.26  These states begin inter-jurisdictional negotiations over
which states may regulate such actions. There are two main ways
to do this: bilateral persuasion and institutionalization.
27
2.2.2.2. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are ultimately "'the costs of running the
economic system."' 28 They include costs of identifying appropri-
ate counter-parties, negotiating with them, and writing and en-
forcing contracts.2 They include both costs in the market and
within an institution, the latter of which includes the costs of
reaching an agreement within an established institutional setting
and the costs of modifying the institutional setting.
2.2.2.3. Transaction Losses
Transaction losses arise from restricting the ability of member
states to regulate in favor of maximizing local preferences.30 They
are analogous to production costs, and are sometimes perceived of
as a threat to sovereignty.
31
2.2.3. Prediction on the Institutionalization of JEOs
In line with the theory set forth above, a discussion of the
theoretical prediction on how institutionalization takes place fol-
lows.
As economic relations among participants of a transaction
deepen and expand, the need for the transaction also increases.
The examples given in the explanation of transaction gains dem-
onstrate how transactions among closely interdependent econo-
mies would take place far more often than transactions among
economies with few direct relations.
32
26 See id. at 491.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 500 (quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Ac-
tivity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation, in
THE ANALYsIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: THE PPB
SYSTEM, vol. 1, U.S. Joint Economic committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 59, at
48).29 See id. at 500.
30 See id. at 544.
31 See id. at 552.
32 Cf. Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective
Action, 49 INT'L ORG. 595, 597 (1995) ("[Tlhe more that the scale of goods and
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However, as inter-governmental transactions increase, the ex-
isting institutional setting will become less efficient. This is due
to the fact that such transactions would most likely include fields
that generate more asset specificity as well as other issues for
which complete contracting is impossible.33  Greater duration
adds further difficulty in completing a contract.34
The concepts of asset specificity and incomplete contracting
require some explanation. "[A]ny transaction where one state ad-
vances consideration at a particular point in time, and must rely
on one or more other states to carry out their end of the bargain
at a later point in time or experience a significant loss in its ex-
pected value, is 'asset specific."' 3 For example, it is often difficult
to re-establish a tariff once it is withdrawn, and harmonization of
a regulation is even more difficult to reverse. 36 Therefore, even if
one state takes advantage of another and defects, the other state
that already took the agreed upon measures (e.g. tariff reduction
or harmonization) cannot reverse this course. ' And, "with
higher'magnitudes of asset specificity and greater uncertainty and
complexity, there are greater incentives and possibilities for op-
portunism."38  Given the positive transaction costs, it is 3mpossi-
ble to write explicit contracts that prevent opportunism. 9 Thus,
as coverage4 0 of a transaction expands and includes areas with
assets produced, exchanged, and/or used in a particular economic sector or ac-
tivity diverges from the structural scale of the national state. . ., then the more
that the authorit leitimacr, policymaking capacity, and policy-implementing
effectiveness ... will be challenged....").
33 From the standpoint of the history of international economic inte-
gration, it might -be theorized that states will engage in integrative
transactions in areas characterized by low asset specificity early. Once
gains from trade in low asset specificity areas are exhausted..., there
are greater incentives.., for integration in higher asset specificity ar-
eas.
Trachtman, supra note 5, at 531.
34 See id at 526.
31 Id. at 522.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 Id. at 524.
39 See id.
4 Throughout this Article, "coverage" refers to the fields that are included
in inter-governmental transactions (e.g., goods, services, investment, intellectual
propert7, and competition policy), but not to smaller sectors covered in indi-
vidual fields (e.g., products covered under tariff reduction agreements).
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higher asset specificity, uncertainty, and complication, transaction
costs will grow unless a more efficient institutional setting is cho-
sen.4 1 The solution is greater institutionalization. 42
However, there is a limit to institutionalization. Greater de-
grees of institutionalization lead to greater transaction losses.
Transaction losses also depend on the size and nature of coverage
and the member states. Expansion of coverage will cause transac-
tion losses in more fields, and expansion in the number of mem-
ber states will create transaction losses against more states. Even
if an agreement includes new coverage, if the restrictions do not
actually restrict the state's ability, (e.g., an agreement on tariff re-
duction on products that do not have a tariff) there are no unique
transaction losses (except the ability to reverse zero tariff policy).
The magnitude of transaction losses also depends on the percep-
tion of the member states about losing their own ability, as well
as on their perception of other member states with whom they
agree to give up such ability. These factors determine how seri-
ously the transaction losses are perceived as losses.
This prediction will be employed and tested below in the ex-
planation of the institutionalization of IEOs.
2.3. Analytical Framework and Methodology
Another building block of this Article, together with the the-
ory of transaction costs, is the framework and methodology for
empirical analysis. Transaction cost theory is operational, non-
tautological, and testable only when it is accompanied by a com-
parative method.43 Empirical analysis, as defined here, is intended
to extend comparative methods to facilitate the simultaneous
comparison of several IEOs within a certain general framework.
This enables us to observe the broader picture as to how the insti-
tutional design of a particular IEO at a particular point in time
looks in comparison to its past and to other IEOs. It also gives us
the empirical tendency of institutional design,44 and is expected to
41 For additional explanation of the connection between incomplete con-
tracts and institutionalization, see infra section 2.3.1.
42 See Trachtman, supra note 5, at 524-25.
41 See id. at 502.
44 The idea of "empirical analysis" is borrowed from econometrics. Just as
econometrics gives economic theory empirical content, the framework for em-
pirical analysis developed below is intended to give empirical content to the
theory of transaction costs developed above. See generally DAMODAR N.
GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 2 (3d ed. 1995).
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give us some idea about the future institutional evolution of an
IEO. This Section will elaborate on this general framework.
2.3.1. Basic Framework
The basic framework consists of two variables: dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms and decision-making, especially legislation. The
salient characteristics of international law that govern inter-
governmental transactions are an incomplete legislation (body of
law) and incomplete dispute resolutions. As a result, "potential
opportunism gives rise to transaction costs which forestall oppor-
tunistic action."46 Here there are two sources of problems, and
therefore two possible solutions. To complete an otherwise in-
complete contract, and thus reduce transaction costs, IEOs have
two non-mutually exclusive options: institutionalization in legis-
lation and institutionalization in dispute resolution. To the ex-
tent that this incompleteness is a problem that any 1EO faces, this
framework is generally applicable.
From a methodological standpoint, this general applicability is
important because it means that the state of institutionalization of
any given ]EO can be analyzed in terms of these two variables.
Accordingly, these IEOs can be plotted in a two-dimensional dia-
gram that shows the relative state of institutionalization of differ-
ent IEOs. Such a diagram will reveal a "degree of institutionaliza-
tion," (i.e., how far an IEO has gone along the spectrum from
spot market transactions to institutionalized transactions), and a
"direction of institutionalization," (i.e., which type of institution-
alization is more heavily employed in the IEO).
2.3.2. Measurement of Institutionalization
The central difficulty in applying this framework to a real
world analysis comes from the difficulty in measurement. Meas-
uring the amount of institutionalization that an IEO employs to
maximize utility is not comparable to measuring how much capi-
tal and labor a firm employs to maximize its profits.
This Article utilizes the following method. I will specify sev-
eral institutional features which are parameters for dispute resolu-
tion and legislation in order to describe the overall degree of insti-
tutionalization of an IEO. These chosen parameters will be
45 See Trachtman, supra note 5, at 529.
46 Id. at 526.
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purported to best highlight the differences among different IEOs,
and represent balanced aspects of institutions. Then I will exam-
ine whether each institutional feature fits each IEO. The total
number of parameters that fit an EEO will be defined as the index
of degree of institutionalization of the lEO. The higher the in-
dex, the higher the degree of institutionalization.
47
2.3.3. Relations with Theory of Transaction Costs
The two-dimensional framework developed in this section can
be used to test the validity of the transactional cost theory. With
a given level of transaction gains, possible institutional designs lie
along a spectrum of degree of institutionalization with respect to
dispute resolution and legislation. Member states will maximize
net gains by choosing the optimal institutional design subject to a
trade-off between reduction of transaction costs by greater and an
increase in transaction losses.48 If transaction costs theory is a
valid hypothesis then the outcome shown in the two-dimensional
framework must reflect the transaction cost economizing solu-
tion.
2.3.4. Behavioral Factors
The primary source of the institutional analysis in this Article
are official documents that formally spell out the institutional de-
sign when possible. It may be questionable whether or not we
should take behavioral factors into account. For example, in in-
dexing each IEO according to the above method, what should be
47 1 owe the concept of this method to political economy literature. See,
e.g., Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,. 25 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 151, 151-62 (1993). For a more extensive comparison of
laws using this index representation, see generally RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL.,
LAW AND FINANCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
5661, 1996). As such, the idea of indexing a law for comparison is not entirely
novel, but these are designed to show the correlation between legal variable and
economic performance. Therefore, a model exhibiting the correlation between
two legal variables seems new.
Assuming a U-shaped "transaction cost curve," just as a standard short-
run production cost curve, under a fixed institutional design, as transactions
among states increase, it will become increasingly costly to engage in further
transactions beyond a certain point. Change in institutional design can make
their transaction more efficient. This is analogous to the distinction between
long-ran and short-run costs of production. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A
COURSE IN MICROECONOMIc THEORY 256-58 (1990).
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done if a parameter analytically fits the IEO on paper, yet is not
actually working that way? Should we count this parameter or
not? Or, if a similar-looking institution actually works very dif-
ferently, should we make some adjustment? For example, should
we "discount" a credit from one that partially fits the parameter,
and then add one credit to the other that fits perfectly? This Ar-
ticle takes the position that, in such a case, we should count the
parameter regardless of the behavioral factor, and we should not
consider any "discount." It is not that the behavior factor is un-
important; certainly, behaviors of the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") play a significant role in the "federal" legal order of the
Community,4 even beyond what one expects from the constitu-
tional provisions.50 In addition, behaviors of national courts
helped the success of the judicial system of the EU.51 A similar-
looking court in another IEO does not necessarily work in the
same way as the ECJ. Arguably, institutional comparison is not
complete unless behaviors are taken into account. After all, insti-
tutions work through behaviors.
However, it is still reasonable to exclude behavioral factors
from our primary focus for the purpose of this Article.5 2 First,
behaviors are generally hard to measure and relatively volatile.
To avoid additional complication and maintain parsimoniousness
of our measurement method of institutionalization, we should fo-
cus on more objective and stable parameters. Second, behavior is
influenced by total institutional design.5 So when we are cor-
49 See Francis G. Jacobs & Kenneth L. Karst, The "Federal" Legal Order: The
U.S.A. and Europe Compared a Juridical Perspective, i INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 177,
195 (Muro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986).
5 See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 204
(1993) ("[D]irect effect and supremacy... are largely creations of the Court of
Justice.").
51 See Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Su-
preme Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial
Federalism, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 445 (1996) (discussing article 177 of the
Treaty of Rome).
52 This approach is employed in political economy literature on central
banks for sirifar reasoning. See Vittorio Grilli et al., Political and Monetary In-
stitutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, 13 ECON.
POL'Y 342, 366-70 (1991).
53 For example, even if the appellate review systems of ASEAN and the
WTO behave differently, the difference may be caused by varying forms of po-
litical intervention. It is no wonder ECJ's appellate court functions are very
different from these two because the total institutional design is very different.
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paring very different institutions, it is of no wonder that we ob-
serve different behaviors. Therefore, in order to devote this Arti-
cle to institutional analysis, and to keep institutional design dis-
tinct from behavior, it is best to assume that differences in the
workings of institutions in this context depend more heavily on
institutional design than on behaviors.
3. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
3.1. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Comparison
One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round is the
enhanced dispute resolution mechanism ("DRM"). Similarly,
ASEAN has recently introduced its DRM.5  This section will
compare the DRMs of the WTO, the EU, and NAFTA with that
of ASEAN. Concerning NAFTA, the Chapter 19 procedure will
be compared separately from the general provisions of Chapter
2056 because it shows distinct features that merit a separate analy-
sis.5 7  Also, I will examine the WTO, even though it is not a
"regional" arrangement.
3.1.1. Parameters
Based on the considerations explained in the previous sec-
tion,58 the parameters are as follows:
It is more of a matter of institutional design than behavior. Comparing the
workings of ASEAN and the EU is not like comparing the workings of the
Warren Court and the Burger Court.
5' See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disutes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 [hereinafter DSUI].
5 See Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Nov. 20, 1996 (visited Jan.
16, 1998) <http://www.aseansec.org/economic/dsm.htm> [hereinafter DSM].
56 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
-7 NAFTA's DRM is separated into five mechanisms. The main mecha-
nism is provided in Chapter 20, which deals with all general disputes arising
under NAFTA. Chapter 19 is the mechanism for review of antidumping and
countervailing duty cases, and Chapter 11 deals with investment disputes. The
two ancillary agreements, the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion ("NAALC") and the North American Agreement on Environment Coop-
eration ("NAAEC"), have their own mechanisms. See Cherie O'Neal Taylor,
Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deep-
ening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 850,
854 (i1996/97).
5 See supra Section 2.3.
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* Basic structure: (a) is it a permanent court system or an ad
hoc panel system; (b) is it composed of judges;
* Procedure: (c) is consultation required before adjudication;
(d) is appellate procedure available or not;
e Effect: (e) does a panel decision automatically become the
final ruling for dispute resolution or is intervention by the disput-
ing parties possible; and (fj does the ruling have an automatic,
binding effect or not?
Justification and analysis of each variable will be elaborated
upon below.
3.1.2. Comparison
3.1.2.1. Court or Panel
The existence of a permanent court is more than symbolic. It
reduces the chance of bargaining between the disputing parties
over the composition of a panel member. This, in turn, increases
the credibility of law and reduces the uncertainty and transaction
costs.
Only the EU has established a judicial institution, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, that has a capacity equal to political institu-
tions, namely the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission. 6
0
It consists of fifteen judges,61 and the President of the Court as-
signs cases. 62  Other RIAs have adopted a panel system, under
which a panel will be established upon request by the disputing
parties.63 Each Secretariat maintains a list of potential panelists,
and panelists of a dispute will be nominated by the Secretariat in
the cases of the WTO and ASEAN or by the disputing Parties
" In selecting these parameters, I first set up a comprehensive list of ele-
ments that constitute a DSU, compared with other panel systems, and then
added elements that constitute other panel systems which a DSU does not have.
Then, I deleted features commonly shared by all the samples from this list, di-
vided the remaining ones under the three headings above, and picked up the pa-
rameters so that they satisfy the conditions stated in Section 2.3., supra.
60 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1,
1958, art. 4.1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 16 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
61 See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EC LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 71 (1995).
62 See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 70.
63 See DSM, supra note 55, art. 5; DSU, supra note 54, para. 6; NAFTA, su-
pra note 56, art. 2008, para. 1.
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under NAFTA. 64 In the course of the panelist selection, bargain-
ing is still possible.
65
However, the appellate review system in the WTO is a depar-
ture from this standard panel system. Members of the Standing
Appellate Body, which is no longer called a "panel," are appointed
by the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), and three of the seven
members serve on any one case in rotation.6 6 There is no provi-
sion similar to that of panelist selection. This is more comparable
to a permanent court.
3.1.2.2. Qualification ofMembers
A judicial system that requires the members of a panel or a
court have qualifications that are equal to that of domestic judges
or lawyers, should be recognized as being oriented more towards
jurisprudence than those that do not require such qualifications.
The judges of the ECJ have to possess the qualifications
"required for the holding of the highest judicial office in their re-
spective countries or who are jurists of a recognised [sic] compe-
tence." 68 However, others define the qualifications for panelists
in much broader language, and do not limit it to legal experts.
The only exception to this can be found in Chapter 19 of
NAFTA, which expresses a clear preference for judges and law-
yers.70 Furthermore, the Extraordinary Challenge Procedure, the
See DSM, supra note 55, app. 2, para. 7; DSU, supra note 54, para. 8.6;
NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2011.
65 However, this opportunity for bargaining has been diminished. See
DSM, supra note 55, app. 2; DSU, supra note 54, para. 8.7.
66 See DSU, supra note 54, para. 17.1.
67 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 125 (2d ed. 1997).
68 Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art. 167.
69 Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or
non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served on
or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of an MTO
Member or of a contracting party to the GATT 1947 or as a represen-
tative to a council or committee of any covered agreement or its
predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on in-
ternational trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy offi-
cial of a Member.
DSU, supra note 54, para. 8.1. Article two, paragraph one of the DSM and arti-
cle 2009 of NAFTA express essentially the same idea.
70 See NAFTA, supra note 56, annex 1901.2, para. 1 ("The roster [of indi-
viduals to serve as panelists in dispute resolution under Chapter 19] shall in-
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appellate body under Chapter 19, requires judge-equivalent per-
sons to serve as panelists,71 even though they are still called
"panelists," not "judges," in the provisions. However, it is worth
noting here that they are expected to interpret domestic laws,72 as
well as provisions of NAFTA, and the binational panel review
replaces judicial review of such determinations of each party.
73
3.1.2.3. Consultation
Relative preference of adjudication over consultation shows
greater limits on discretion of member states in dispute resolu-
tion. It is common for panel systems to require consultations
among disputing parties before requesting the establishment of a
panel. 4 However, NAFTA's Chapter 19 is an exception once
again. It does not provide a procedure for consultation for initial
review. Rather, consultation before panel review is only required
in a dispute to safeguard the Panel Review System that arises after
the initial review has been completed (in this case reviewed by a
special committee) .
3.1.2.4. Appellate Review
An appellate review procedure enhances the credibility of the
law and reduces uncertainty. It is available in many panel mecha-
nisms,76 with the only exception being NAFTA's Chapter 20.
Appellate review of ASEAN appears to be a little different be-
cause it is an inter-governmental body which has ASEAN Eco-
clude judges or former judges to the fullest extent practicable.");see also id. an-
nex 1901.2, para. 2 ("A majority of the panelists on each panel shall be lawyers
in good standing.").
71 See id annex 1904.13, para. 1 ("The members shall be selected from a 15-
person roster comprised of judges or former judges of a federal judicial court of
the United States or a judicial court of superior jurisdiction of Canada, or a fed-
eral udicial court of Mexico.").
)2See id art. 1904, para. 2 ("[A] panel review[s] ... a final antidumping. or
countervailing duty determinationr... of an importing Party to determine
whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty law of the importing Party.").
73 See id. art. 1904, para. 1.
74 See DSM, supra note 55, art. 4, para. 1; DSU, supra note 54, para. 4.7;
NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2003.
75 See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 1905.
76 See DSM, supra note 55, art. 8; DSU, supra note 54, para. 17; NAFTA,
supra note 56, annex 1904.13.
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nomic Ministers ("AEM"), who receive such an appeal, and no
panel procedure is provided. 7
The ECJ has served as a federal court in relation to the other
courts in the Community.78  It has become an appellate court at
the Community level due to the establishment of the Court of
First Instance in 1988 which was given "jurisdiction to hear and
determine at first instance, subject to a right of appeal to the
Court of Justice on points of law."79 Initially, the court was only
given limited jurisdiction by Decision 88/591, O.J. (C 215) over
staff and competition cases, in addition to coal and steel cases aris-
ing from the ECSC Treaty,80 but it "now has jurisdiction over all
actions brought by 'non-privileged' parties-i.e. parties other than
Member States or Community institutions."
81
3.1.2.5. Political Intervention
Under the panel system, a panel report is not considered the
final ruling. It usually has to be approved by an inter-
governmental body, which is by nature more political than judi-
cial. Examples include the DSB in the WTO, and the Senior
Economic Officials Meeting ("SEOM") in ASEAN. An exception
to this practice is NAFTA's Chapter 19, which does not provide
for any such involvement. Besides this formality, the procedures
of the WTO, ASEAN, and NAFTA are tremendously different.
Under WTO procedures, "the report shall be adopted at a DSB
meeting unless ... the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
report."8 2 This is virtually the same as a panel report which is
automatically binding, and thus, political intervention is signifi-
cantly limited. In contrast, the procedure under NAFTA's Chap-
ter 20 allows disputing parties, which cannot be institutions, to
reach a final resolution based on the panel report. Consecuently,
it is not much different from a mere consultation system. 3 Pro-
7 This may appear to be a little strange, but the GATT's DRM used to be
organized in this manner. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194;see also Tay-
lor, supra note 57, at 872-73.
78 See Jacobs & Karst, supra note 49, at 192.
79 Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art. 168a.
80 See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 73.
81 CRAIG & DE BOIRCA, supra note 61, at 75.
82 DSU, supra note 54, para. 16.4 (footnote omitted).
:3 See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2018.
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cedurally, ASEAN lies somewhere between NAFTA and the
WTO. The SEOM is authorized to make a ruling based on a
simple panel majority, at which the disputing parties "can be pre-
sent during the process of deliberation but shall not participate in
the ruling." 84 ASEAN differs from NAFTA because the panel
report is not directly addressed by disputing parties themselves.
ASEAN also differs from the WTO since it takes simple majority
rule, which still allows disputing parties to gather support from
other members. Thus, under the ASEAN dispute resolution pro-
cedures, political intervention is still possible.
3.1.2.6. Binding Effect
Once a final decision is issued, the next question is what is its
legal effect. Many DRMs explicitly provide that a decision shall
be automatically binding,85 or, alternatively, that it must be ac-
cepted by the parties before any further measures may be taken.
8 6
The one exception is NAFTA's Chapter 20, which only requires
that the parties "normally shall conform, 87 with the recommen-
dations of the panel, and leaves the parties to agree upon a final
resolution.
3.1.3. Summary
The preceding comparison is summarized in Table 1 which
is contained in the Appendix to this Article. Asterisks show that
each IEO fits the parameters above, and the total number for each
IEO is shown in the column on the right. To clarify the meaning
of each parameter, a "reverse parameter" is provided in each col-
umn below. This is simply the opposite to "parameter;" there-
fore, an asterisk is not shown when an IEO fits this "reverse pa-
rameter."
3.2. Legislation System in Comparison
The next set of issues deals with the institutional features of
decision-making, most notably legislation. This section deals
84 DSM, supra note 55, art. 7.
5 See DSM, supra note 55, art. 8, para. 3; NAFTA,supra note 56, art. 1904,
para. 9.
86 See DSU, supra note 54, para. 17.14; Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art.
171.
8z NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2018.
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with the Organisation for Economic Development and Coopera-
tion ("OECD") and includes comparisons to the organizations
discussed in the previous section.
3.2.1. Parameters
88
The parameters addressed here are as follows:
* Inter-governmental organs: (a) whether an inter-
governmental body within an arrangement is subject to an inter-
nal constraint; (b) whether majority voting is available in their
decision-making;
* Secretariats: (c) whether the Secretariat is independent of its
member states; (d) whether they have the capacity to initiate deci-
sion-making in the institution;
* Parliaments: (e) whether they are composed of directly
elected representatives; and (f) whether directly elected representa-
tives are involved in decision-making.
Again, justifications for these parameters will be provided be-
low.
3.2.2. Comparison
3.2.2.1. Internal Constraints upon Inter-Governmental
Bodies 9
International organizations uniformly contain institutions
consisting of representatives from member states. Examples from
the organizations discussed above are: The Ministerial Confer-
ence, the General Council and other Councils of the WTO;90 the
Council of the EU;91 the Free Trade Commission of the
NAFTA;92 the ASEAN Heads of Government, the ASEAN Min-
isterial Meeting ("AMM"), the ASEAN Economic Ministers
In choosing these parameters, I first estabhshed the three categories of
institutional features above and classified the features of each RIA into one of
the categories. Then I selected parameters so that they satisfy the conditions
stated in Section 2.3., supra.
89 "[T]he term 'inter-governmental' here denoting [sic] a relationship be-
tween states of the kind generally found under international law, with no fed-
eral or supranational element." Jacobs & Karst, supra note 49, at 184.
90 See Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Dec.
15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13, art. IV [hereinafter WTO].
91 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art. 146.
92 See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2001.
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("AEM"), and other series of ministerial meetings in ASEAN;
93
and the Council in OECD.94 Contrary to what their names sug-
gest, they belong to different species.
The term "internal constraint" means constraints placed upon
the competence of an inter-governmental body by other institu-
tions within an RIA, (i.e., institutional checks and balances). The
word "internal" is chosen to contrast with "external" constraints,
which constrain the competence of inter-governmental bodies
through checks imposed by member states outside of an RIA.
Recall that institutionalization is intended to complete an other-
wise incomplete contract, thereby reducing the possibility of op-
portunism due to potential transactions outside of a given institu-
tional arrangement. 95  Therefore, internal constraints are an
indicator of institutionalization, whereas external constraints are
an indicator of under-institutionalization.
The Council of the EU is subject to significant internal con-
straints. As the Treaty of Rome indicates, it is only one of five
institutions of the Community, listed second only to the Euro-
pean Parliament. The Council plays a key role in the adoption
of the budget and legislation, yet it is the Commission, not the
Council itself, that has exclusive authority to initiate legislation.
97
The Parliament's involvement in the legislative process is growing
increasingly important due to the introduction of "parliamentary
cooperation procedures" and "parliamentary co-decision proce-
dures;" the latter of which essentially gives Parliament a veto
98power.
Other organizations exhibit few internal constraints. The role
of the Council in the OECD and of the Ministerial Conference in
the WTO is defined simply as everything under the agreement.
99
93 See, e.g., ASEAN Declaration, supra note 8; Declaration of ASEAN Con-
cord, Feb. 24, 1976, (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.asean.or.id/
POLITICS/POL AGR3.HTM> [hereinafter Declaration of Concord].
9' See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 7, 888 U.N.T.S. 179, 185 [hereinafter OECD].
95 See supra Section 2.3.1.
96 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art. 4.
97 See id. arts. 189a, 189b, 189c.
98 The European Council, the summit meeting of the Heads of Govern-
ment, is also becoming institutionalized. Seeinfra Section 4.3.
99 See WTO, supra note 90, art. IV, para. 1 ("The Ministerial Conference
shall carry out the functions of the MTO, and take actions necessary to this ef-
fect."; OECD, supra note 94, art. 7 ("A Council... shall be the body from
which all acts of the Organisation derive.").
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ASEAN is similar to these two, although the function of its min-
isterial meetings is hardly documented. The Heads of Govern-
ment remains undefined, 00 even though it is described as "[t]he
highest authority of ASEAN" empowered "to lay down direc-
tions and initiatives for ASEAN activities."10 1 The AMM, which
is described as being "responsible for the formulation of policy
guidelines and coordination of ASEAN activities, " '02 is the only
intergovernmental body documented at its inception in the
ASEAN Declaration; its specific function, however, is still unde-
fined.'0 3 The AEM is better defined than the others.'0 4 But noth-
ing suggests particular "internal constraints" like those in the EU.
Finally, NAFTA presents a good example of external con-
straints. It narrowly limits the Commission's authority on mat-
ters not specifically listed in the provisions to "consider," but not
to act upon. 05 "This is an important limitation on the power of
the Commission to self-expand its authority." 6 In other words,
the parties reserve their rights outside the framework of NAFTA.
100 See Declaration of Concord, supra note 93 ("Meeting of the Heads of
Government of the member states as and when necessary."; cf Jacques Pelk-
mans, Institutional Requirements of ASEAN with Special Re erence to AFTA, in
AFTA: THE WAY AHEAD, supra note 9, at 99, 103.
101 ASEAN Secretariat, Organisational Structure (visited Feb. 2, 1998)




See ASEAN Declaration, supra note 8, at 1234-35 ("[T]o carry out these
aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established: (a) Annual
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall beby rotation and referred to as
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.").104
See Economic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 12, art. 8 ("The
ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting and its subsidiary bodies shall review the
progress of implementation and coordination of the elements contained in this
Agreement."); Declaration of Concord, supra note 93 ("Ministerial meetings on
economic matters shall be held regularly... to: i) formulate recommendations
for the consideration of Governments of member states...; ii) review the co-
ordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes .... ").105
See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2001 ("The Commission shall: ... (e)
consider any other matter that may affect the operation of this Agreement.");
see also FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTE-
GRATION 28 (1995).
106 ABBOT, supra note 105, at 28.
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3.2.2.2. Majority Voting
Majority voting is another indicator of institutionalization in
the decision-making process. Majority voting makes it easier to
make decisions as an RIA and eliminates the veto power that is
present under unanimous voting. The EU makes the most exten-
sive use of majority voting. The Treaty of Rome states that
"[e]xcept where otherwise provided for in this Treaty, the conclu-
sions of the Council shall be reached by a majority vote of its
members." 07 Majority voting is employed in many decisions re-
garding a wide range of areas where votes are weighted and a
qualified majority consists of fifty-four out of seventy-six votes.
10 8
Some of these areas include agriculture, transportation, competi-
tion law, commercial policy, most measures in environmental and
consumer protection, public health, and education.'0 9
The basic decision-making rule in the WTO is as follows:
"The MTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by con-
sensus followed under the GATT [of] 1947. Except as otherwise
provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the
matter at issue shall be decided by voting," and "each Member of
the MTO shall have one vote." 1 0 As to the legislative process,
the WTO treaty provides that amendments generally "shall take
effect for the Members that have accepted them upon acceptance
by two-thirds of the Members,""' and that any amendments to
certain important provisions "shall take effect only upon accep-
tance by all Members."" 2 In either case, an amendment does not
take effect in a Member State until that Member accepts it.1 13 For
other legislation, the WTO Charter provides that "[t]he MTO
shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Mem-
107 Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art. 148, para. 1.
108 See id. art. 148, para. 2.
109 See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 52. This does not mean that
unanimous voting has ceased to exist. The Luxembourg Compromise requires
the Council to unanimously agree to an issue concerning the very important
interests" of a member state. Even after the Single European Act of 1987 and
the Treaty on European Union of 1992, it may still survive. See JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 192 (1995).
110 WTO, supra note 90, art. IX, para. 1 (footnote omitted).
m Id. art. X, para. 3.
1 Id. art. X, para. 2.
113 An exception is an amendment to Annex 2 (DSU) and Annex 3
(TPRM), which can only be amended by the Mfinisterial Council; however, the
former requires consensus. See id art. X, para. 8.
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bers ..... ,114 This provision does not seem to differ from conven-
tional treaty making. Therefore, even though majority voting is
available in ordinary decision-making, it is not available with re-
spect to legislation.
The OECD and NAFTA are basically designed to operate by
consensus. ASEAN's decision-making rules also seem to be
based on consensus, 116 since much of ASEAN's major legislation
(agreement, protocol or understanding117 ) is promulgated through
the traditional treaty making process where it is signed by the
Heads of Government or related ministers. But other than the
recently signed Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Coopera-
tion in Finance, this is not explicit in any official documents.
3.2.2.3. General Status of the Secretariat: Insulation from
Member States
Many heads of Secretariats are appointed by an inter-
governmental body119  and are given independent status.
1 20
NAFTA, whose Secretariat is comprised of "National Sections"
"' Id. art. III, para. 2.
11. The OECD and NAFTA differ slightly in their requirement of consen-
sus among Members. Abstention in the OECD does not invalidate decisions
(only opposition does so), while abstention in NAFTA invalidates decisions.
See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2001, para. 3; OECD,supra note 94, arts. 5, 6;
see also Frederick M. Abbott, Integration without Institutions: The NAFTA Muta-
tion of the EC Model and the Future of the GA YT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L.
917, 933-34 (1992).
116 The founding declaration of ASEAN proclaims that the Member States
"are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference
in any form or manifestation in order to preserve theirnational identities in ac-
cordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples." ASEAN Declara-
tion, supra note 8 (emphasis added).117
See, e.g., DSM, supra note 55, app. 1 (isting the DSM's covered agree-
ments). However, the DSM does not cover all legislation in ASEAN. Also
note that declarations often play an important role. The most obvious example
is the ASEAN Declaration, the very foundation of ASEAN.
18 See Finance Understanding, supra note 20, art. 5, para. 1.
119 See WTO, supra note 90, art. VI, paras. 2, 3; Protocol Amending the
Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat (Restructuring of the
ASEAN Secretariat), July 22, 1992 (visited Jan. 15, 1998)
<http://www.asean.or.ic/politics/prasec92.htm>, art. 3, para. 1 [hereinafter
ASEAN Secretariat Agreement]; OECD, supra note 94, art. 10; Treaty of Rome,
supra note 60, art. 158.
120 See WTO, supra note 90, art. VI, para. 4;ASEAN Secretariat Agreement,
supra note 119, art. 3, para. 1; OECD,supra note 94, art. 11; Treaty of Rome,
supra note 60, art. 157, para. 2.
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but has no Secretary-General, is an exception. Each party has the
responsibility and discretion to establish and manage the office of
its Section and to designate its Secretary. Only the address of the
Section shall be provided to the Commission.
1 1
3.2.2.4. Capacity of Secretariat to Initiate
The most basic responsibility of Secretariats generally involves
administrative work. The NAFTA Secretary has limited respon-
sibility and specifically "provide[s] administrative assistance."
1 "
The WTO Charter only addresses the budget planning responsi-
bilities of the Secretary.
However, other RIA's go further. The Commission of the
EU, which almost entirely monopolizes legislative initiatives,
represents an extreme case of expanded responsibility.'23  Al-
though other Secretariats possess some initiative responsibility,
their capacity to do so is more limited than that of the EU's
Commission. The ASEAN's Secretary-General "initiate[s], ad-
vise[s], co-ordinate[s] and implement[s] ASEAN activities,"
"address[es] the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on all aspects of re-
gional co-operation and offer[s] assessments and recommendations
on ASEAN's external relations," and "chair[s], on behalf of the
Chairman of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, all Meetings of the
Standing Committee except the first and last."1 24 The OECD
Secretary-General "may submit proposals to the Council or to
any other body of the Organisation" and "serve as Chairman of
the Council meeting at sessions of Permanent Representatives."
125
3.2.2.5. Directly Elected Representatives
Directly electing representatives is a unique feature of the EU.
The European Parliament "shall be composed of representatives
of the peoples of the States united within the Community"
126
elected "by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform
121 See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 2002, paras. 1, 2.
122 Id. art. 2002, para. 3.
123 See Jacobs & Karst, supra note 49, at 187 ("'Generally' but not always,
the Council can legislate only on the basis of a proposal from the Commis-sion.").
Qo4 ASEAN Secretariat Agreement, supra note 119, art. 3, para. 2(iv, xv, xvi).
125 OECD, supra note 94, art. 10, para. 2.
126 Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, art. 137.
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procedure in all Member States." 127 Although some of the heads
of state who assemble for ministerial meetings are either elected
directly or by parliament, each of these officials represents the ex-
ecutive branch.
12
3.2.2.6. Involvement in Decision-Making
Decision-making power of the European Parliament is still
limited. As discussed above, the Commission proposes legisla-
tion, and the Council has the primary power in directing the leg-
islative process. The allocation of power is the same with respect
to the budgetary process. However, the 1992 Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, which deleted the description of the Parliament as an
"advisory and supervisory" body in Article 137 of the Treaty of
Rome, symbolized an increase in the Parliament's power.129
Moreover, the Parliament has been granted a veto power, in the
form of a co-decision procedure, in certain areas.
130
3.2.3. Summary
The preceding comparison is summarized in Table 2 in the
Appendix.
4. FINDINGS
4.1. Regional Economy in Comparison
Departing from institutions for a while, let us briefly look at
the state of regional economic relations based on intra-regional
and extra-regional trade as a share of total export and GNP of the• 131
region.
"2 Id. art. 138, para. 3; cf CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 61, at 58 (stating
that "the uniform efectoral procedure envisaged by the original Article 138(3) of
the EC Treaty is still not in existence").
128 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 931.
129 See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 66.
130 See id. at 89-90.
131 The state of regional integration is often described with a share of intra-
regional export in total export. See, e.g., Akrasanee & Stifel, supra note 9, at 32.
However, "the share of intra-regional trade in total trade is not the most rele-
vant measure of dependence on extra-regional trade. The importance of extra-
regional trade is more usefully measured by the ratio of total extra-regional
trade-exports plus imports--to GNP." Robert Z. Lawrence, Emerging Re-
gional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, in INTERNATIONAL
PoLTIcAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 407,
[Vol 19:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss1/3
1998] COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR IEOs 77
4.1.1. Intra-Regional Exports
32
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the state of trade relations
within each regional economy. The EU and Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation ("APEC") are much more dependent on the
region than other RIAs in terms of trade volume. NAFTA and
ASEAN are located in the middle, but a clear contrast is observed
in that NAFTA depends on regional economy more than





Figure 2 in the Appendix shows the importance of the exter-
nal trade relations for each respective region. Unlike Figure 1, the
EU and APEC show very similar figures, together with NAFTA,
while only ASEAN is exceptionally dependent on outside of the
region.
4.1.3. Implication to Institutional Design
Exact interpretation of the data deserves separate economic
analysis with more extensive data, but for the purpose of this Ar-
411 (aeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 3d ed. 1995). I only discuss ex-
ports because, for the purpose of inter-regional comparison, adding imports
does not make a dramatic difference.
132 See generally UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS 1994 (1995) [hereinafter UN]
(discussing the intra-trade of 1993); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1995 (1995) [hereinafter WORLD BANK] (discussing the GNP per cap-
ita and population of 1993); OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 1995
REPORT (1996) (discussing the GNP of Brunei and Taiwan of 1993). Note that
the intra-trade data of ASEAN does not include data of the recent member
states, i.e., Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, and that the APEC intra-trade data
does not include Taiwan.
133 However, ASEAN's export share of GNP can be a statistical exaggera-
tion. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 9, at 441 ("Much of ASEAN's intrare-
gional trade can be explained by transshipments through Singapore.... rather
than traded goods actually consumed withiin the ASEAN region.");see also Ak-
rasanee & Stifel, supra note 9, at 32. This shows that a more accurate analysis
would require data on each member state.
134 See generally UN, supra note 132; WORLD BANK, supra note 132.
135 It seems surprising but it is not. (The share of total export per GNP) =
(the share of intra-regional export per GNP) / (the share of intra-regional ex-
port per total export). Thus, less 'intra-regional export per GNP" and more
"intra-regional export per total export" in NAFTA than in ASEAN implies less
"total export per GNP" in NAFTA.
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ticle, the following two preliminary points may be made. First, it
makes sense if a region is highly dependent on the regional econ-
omy and less dependent on the outside like the EU,16 and is
highly institutionalized. 3 7  Second, it is not surprising if regions
with different patterns on the figures like NAFTA and ASEAN
have different tendencies in institutionalization. The following
sections will focus on comparison in institutional designs.
4.2. General Institutional Comparison
4.2.1. General Institutional Design: Empirical Data
Figure 3 in the Appendix is the overall summary of the pre-
ceding institutional comparison. The index of institutionalization
on legislation is on the horizontal axis and the index of institu-
tionalization on dispute resolution is on the vertical axis. Thus,
the state of institutionalization for legislation and for dispute reso-
lution is represented in the vector from the origin. As introduced
in Section 2.3.2., this vector shows the empirical tendency in de-
gree of institutionalization and direction of institutionalization.
The "degree" is represented by the distance from the origin, and
the "direction" is represented by the direction of the vector from
the origin. In terms of "degree," we have two outlines: the EU
has the highest by far and NAFTA has the lowest rate among the
samples. Others are located in the middle. In terms of
"direction," all the RIAs, the EU, ASEAN, and NAFTA are lo-
cated on the same ray from the origin, but the OECD is in the
opposite region to the WTO and NAFTA's Chapter 19, separated
by the ray. Because incomplete contracts invite opportunism, and
"the prospect of ex post bargaining invites ex ante pre-positioning
of an inefficient kind,"3  institutionalization in both legislation
and dispute resolution is generally necessary to minimize transac-
tion costs. This hypothesis fits particularly well with RIAs, to a
lesser extent with the WTO, but not with the OECD and
NAFTA's Chapter 19 as seen in both cross-sectional (cross-
jurisdictional) comparison in the diagram and the time-series
136 But less than inter-regional trade of the United States. See PAUL
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS THEORY
AND POLICY 631 (4th ed. 1997).
137 See infra Section 2.2.3.
138 Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analy-
sis ofDiscrete StructuralAlternatives, 36 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 269, 279 (1991).
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comparison shown in the development path of some of the
IEOs139 on the diagram.
40
4.2.2. Rationale for Institutional Design
The next task is to see if the transaction cost theory can ex-
plain the current state of institutional design of individual IEOs.
This section will try to provide possible explanations based on the
theory.
4.2.2.1. NAFTA: Integration Without Institutions;
141
Adjudication Without Institutions
One of the characteristics of NAFTA is that it "does not re-
quire the states to take any steps towards positive integration,
such as the adoption of harmonized legislation."' Also, "[m]any
of the free trade arrangement goals are actually met by border
measures (the phasing out of tariffs) or the elimination of other
non-tariff barriers to trade."' 43 From the standpoint of transac-
tion costs, since harmonization involves a more congelling case
of asset specificity than elimination of trade barriers, there is a
139 The institutional development of ASEAN will be described in the next
section. For the WTO,
[p]erhaps the most significant achievement... is the result of the Uru-
guay Round concerning institutions. Not only has an impressive new
set of dispute settlement procedures been put forward, but a new char-
ter for an international organization- the World Trade Organization
(WTO) - has been approved as a sort of 'capstone' for the many
complicated provisions of the negotiation results.
John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections on the 'Boilerroom" of
International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595, 600 (1995).
140 Note that this diagram may be somewhat deceptive. For example, the
degree of institutionalization of the DRM in NAFTA and the OECD cannot
be the same because the OECD has no DRM in the first place. Also, this dia-
gram does not mean that NAFTA is merely an example of institutional anar-
chy. This scatterplot shows the relative location of different organizations
within the limits of a two-dimensional plane with a non-negative index. For
the purpose of the analysis in this Article, however, this diagram sufficiently
reflects the real world.
141 This title is taken from Abbott, supra note 115.
142 Taylor, supra note 57, at 865; see also ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, RE-
GIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER INTEGRATION 70-72 (1996)
("NAFTA can thus be classified as a genuine GATT-plus agreement. However,
in numerous areas it goes no further than GATT.").
143 Taylor, supra note 57, at 865.
144 See Trachtman, supra note 5, at 522.
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lower need for institutionalization.44 Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that NAFTA is less institutionalized than other RIAs.
In addition, the U.S., the major member state of NAFTA, has
consistently resisted supra-national decision-making, 146 and this
sentiment against customs unions seems to also be shared by other
members.' 4" The goal of NAFTA (transaction gains) and the
negative perception of supra-nationalism (transaction losses) are
the underlying rationale for NAFTA's minimalist approach.
Why, then, is NAFTA equipped with such a special DRM as
provided in Chapter 19? The legislative history of Chapter 19
shows that
the Canadian government had hoped to exempt Canadian
goods from U.S. AD [antidumping] and CVD
[countervailing duty] laws.... The U.S. refused to agree
to such an exemption. In its place, Canada accepted the
binational review procedure as a means of placing some
limits on the use of these laws by U.S. authorities.
Therefore, this institutional arrangement between the U.S.
and Canada resulted in raising transaction gains of Canada at the
expense of transaction losses of the U.S., but to a much lesser ex-
tent than Canada had originally hoped. It should have been pos-
sible for the U.S. and Canada to create a legislative body that
would deal with competition law as well as the DRM, but the re-
sult was to establish a special DRM instead, and the idea of regu-
lating AD and CVD as a part of the bilateral agreement was abol-
ished altogether. Thus, the standard of review of this special
DRM is that of domestic law, and not the agreement.1
49
This shows that the Chapter 19 arrangement has to be under-
stood in a broader context in which both countries made a grand
bargain to create the CUSFTA (Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement), which was made to equilibrate the net gains of the
145 See supra Section 2.2.; see also Taylor, supra note 57, at 866.
146 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 931.
147 See LAWRENCE, supra note 142, at 101 ("Had such a rule [that only cus-
toms unions should be permitted by the GATT] been in effect, NAFTA would
never have been concluded, since it is hard to imagine any of the three countries
being willing to give up their trade policy independence.").
1 8 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 109, at 691.
149 See NAFTA, supra note 56, art. 1904, para. 3; see also id. annex 1911.
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U.S. and Canada in their bilateral trade. At the same time, this
agreement has to be understood in a context specific to the
CUSFTA (or NAFTA) because such agreements do not happen
often. To the contrary, the WTO Antidumping Code utilizes a
unique "standard of review" provision 150 that limits the authority
of the dispute settlement panel in fact-finding and interpreting the
Code. The U.S. tried to impose this standard of review on the
panel because it viewed several GATT panel decisions as "too in-
trusive."151 This is an interesting example of a country adopting
different net gain maximizing solutions to the same issue depend-
ing on the situation.!12  Considering that the basic purpose of
AD/CDV laws is to achieve a level playing field by offsetting dif-
ferent policies and practices, it is understandable that the U.S.
could compromise with Canada over restrictions on AD/CVD,
but not in the WTO, which includes a much more diverse group
of countries.1 5 3 In this regard, it would be interesting to see the
future course of events with the enlargement of NAFTA
5 4
However, all these have limited implications to other RIAs.
150 See Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, annex 1A, 33 I.L.M.
1125.
151 See, e.g., New Zealand-Imports of Electrical Transformers from Fin-
land, July 18, 1985, GATT B.I.S.D., (32d Supp.) at 67 (1985) (Rejecting the ar-
gument that the panel cannot challenge or scrutinize the determination of ma-
terial injury, the panel noted that this kind of argument "would lead to an
unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade
relations as governed by the GATT."). For an outline of the origins of the
American view, see Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Proce-
dures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM J.
INT'L L. 193, 195-97 (1996).
152 This is also an example of how transaction losses and perceptions about
it play a role in institutionar design. Seesupra Section 2.2.3.
', See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 109, at 667-69.
154 The NAFTA debate provides a precedent. While the CUFSTA did not
spark much debate in the U.S., NAFTA was much more politically charged.
See LAWRENCE, supra note 142, at 72-73. Another commentator also notes the
importance of perception in forming an RIA.
Whether or not Japan is really a radically different kind of player from
other advanced nations, the perception that it is has done a great deal
to undermine the perceived effectiveness and legitimacy of the GATT
in the United States and Europe. So the great advantage of regional
pacts is that they can exclude Japan.
Paul Krugman, The Move Toward Free Trade Zones, ECON. REV. OF FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, Nov./Dec. 1991, at 5, 19 (footnote omitted).
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4.2.2.2. The OECD: Institutions Without Adjudication
Powers
The OECD provides a counter-example to NAFTA's Chapter
19. The broad scope of its agenda is supported by the Secretariat
with twenty directorates, but the OECD does not have a
DRM.15 5 It is "a forum in which governments can compare their
experiences, discuss the problems they share and seek solutions
which can then be applied within their own national contexts
[and] the practice of self-assessment being the most original char-
acteristic of the OECD." 156 There are some unique characteris-
tics of the OECD that can account for this institutional feature
from the standpoint of the transaction cost theory. First, since
member states of the OECD are important to each other both po-
litically, as well as economically, opportunistic behavior by a
state would not be beneficial to that state in the long-run. 5 7 It
would find that it would be in its national interest to maintain its
reputation as a reliable partner by, observing the OECD rules,
even in the absence of a DRM.15 8 Second, and related, if the rules
are self-enforcing to all members there is no need for a DRM.
Relative homogenity of membersisq may help this to work. Since
the OECD operates without a DRM, it is likely that the OECD
will take up only those issues that are sufficiently self-enforcing or
those in which reputation effects sufficiently hinder member
155 For example, the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported
Export Credits defines aid projects that deserve tied aid assistance, but it is still"a gentlemen's agreement with no formal dispute settlement," and compliance
is based on a procedural arrangement that facilitates mutual monitoring.OECD Countries Agree on New Export Credit Guidelines for Tied Aid, Dec. 5,
1996 (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/news and events/ re-
lease/nw96110a.htm >. For the consultation procedure in the-pre~ious version
of this arrangement _(at the time of this writing, the redrafted version is not yet
available on the web), see Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported
Export Credits, Apr. 1992, para. 14 (visited Mar. 8, 1998)
< http://www.oecd.org/ ech/pub/arang-e.pdf >.
15 What is the OECD?, (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/
about/whats.htm >.
157 [T]he peer pressure system encourages countries to be transparent, to
provide explanations and justifications, and to be self-critical where necessary."
158 This is known as the effects of reputation. See OLIVER HART, FIRMs,
CoNTRACTs, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 66-68 (1995) (explaining the effects
of reputation); see also Trachtman, supra note 5, at 528-29 (indicating that repu-
tation can be used to enforce international agreements).
159 See What is the OECD, supra note 156.
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states from deviating. Third, OECD does not exist as an island;
given that most of the members of the OECD are members of the
WTO and many are members of the EU, the issues that are not
deemed to be appropriate to deal with in the OECD can be
treated in the WTO or the EU. Finally, it may be the case that
there are too many members in the OECD for it to become rig-
idly institutionalized because such rigidity involves too significant
transaction losses.'
60
4.2.2.3. The EU. Integration Through Law and Institution
Contrary to NAFTA's Chapter 19 and the OECD, the EU
exhibits a balanced and exceptionally high degree of institution-
alization. The EU's state of economic interdependence is higher
than that of the organizations discussed in the previous sections.
Its share of intra-EU exports out of the total exports has been
steadily rising. The coverage of the treaty creating the EU is
defined 6 2 and construed broadly 6 1 such that "virtually any meas-
ure likely to advance the common market, promote the conver-
gence of Member State economic policies or simply enhance eco-
nomic performance within the Community would respond to a
legitimate Community purpose."' 64  Therefore, it is reasonably
predictable that such an RIA needs a high degree of institutionali-
zation in both its decision-making (ex ante) as well as its DRMs (ex
post) for the minimization of transaction costs to be achieved.
165
The EU contrasts with the NAFTA in this regard, but it also
differs from the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA"). Un-
like the EU, the EFTA apparently did not generate much asset
160 These characteristics of the OECD are largely unique to "intermediate"
IEOs that are larger than regional but smaller than global organizations. Thus,
the OECD maybe compared to APEC and the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas ("FTAA"). The OECD may be a good reference in analyzing those
organizations, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
161 In 1970, the percentage was 53.2% and in 1993, it was 61.2%. See UN,
supra note 132.
162 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, arts. 2, 3.
163 "[T]he Court of Justice has long authorized expansive interpretations of
Community competence on an 'implied power' theory without use of Article
235." BERMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 31.
164 Id at 30.
165 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral integration, 94J. POL. Sc. 691, 716
(1986).
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specificity among member states.1" In addition, the EFTA's in-
tra-regional economic interdependence, which was initially
minimal, declined even further as time passed.' 67 By now, an
agreement to establish an European Economic Area ("EEA") has
extended an extensive body of Community law to EFTA coun-
tries.
168
4.3. Future Institutional Evolution ofASEAN
Previous Sections have described that each RIA has its own
unique institutional design based on its unique development, and
showed that it is possible to explain from the standpoint of trans-
action cost theory. As shown in Figure 3 in the appendix,
ASEAN sits in the middle of the ray of RIAs that connects the
EU and NAFTA. This final section will try to apply the theory
and framework developed in this Article to an analysis of the in-
stitutional evolution of ASEAN and explores whether general
empirical results and individual experiences of predecessors have
any implication for the future institutional evolution of ASEAN.
4.3.1. Background
4.3.1.1. Objectives ofASEAN
Several ASEAN objectives impact its future institutional de-
velopment. First, unlike other RIAs, the primary objective of
ASEAN covers not only economics but also politics and security.
The latter two concerns have always been more important than
economic issues. Second, AFTA is only a part of the economic
integration measures of ASEAN. 169 Third, one of the most com-
pelling motivations for the formation of the FTA was to attract
166 "Like the U.S. and Canada, the EFTA countries have provided for and
accomplished an intra-FTA elimination of tariff barriers and quantitative re-
strictions on trade in goods. This goal has been accomplished without a policy
of legal harmonization and with a minimum of friction between the EFTA
countries." Abbott, supra note 115, at 940.
167 In 1970, the intra-regional interdependence was 18.1%; it fell to 11.4%
in 1993. See U.N., supra note 132.
168 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 941.
Symbolically, the Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed by the
Heads of Government, while the AFTA Agreement was signed by ministers.
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foreign direct investment rather than to facilitate intra-ASEAN
trade.' 70  This together with a move towards harmonization,1
7 1
supports the co of "open regionalism," 172 a term that is often em-
phasized, but has never been defined.
4.3.1.2. The Scope of Economic Integration
The framework for economic integration of ASEAN is set
forth in the Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1992 and has
been expanded by subsequent agreements and declarations. In ad-
dition to the establishment of AFTA, '73 other economic integra-
tion measures, beyond tariff elimination, have been announced,
and include the following: "t h
9 the elimination of non-tariff barriers through "the har-
monisation of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and certi-
fication of products, removal of barriers to foreign investments,
macroeconomic consultations, rules for fair competition, promo-
tion for venture capital;" 175  176
* the liberalization of trade in services and cooperation in
the intellectual property arena that ultimately explores setting up
of an ASEAN patent and trademark system and an ASEAN Pat-
ent Office; 77 and
* the harmonisation of tariff nomenclature, customs valua-
tions, and other customs procedures.1
7 8
Considering the fact that all of these measures were an-
nounced or amended between 1996 and 1997, recent develop-
ments are remarkable. This also means, however, that economic
170 See Akrasanee & Stifel, supra note 9, at 33, 36; see also Joint Press State-
ment, The 29th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, paras. 16-17 (held Oct. 16,
1997) (visited Mar. 7, 1998) < http://www.aseansec.org/aem29/eco-e29.htm >
[hereinafter Joint Press Statement].
171 "If regional arrangements go beyond border barriers and reflect agree-
ments on domestic practices that reinforce market forces, they will make entry
for outsiders easier and create rather than divert external trade." LAWRENCE,
supra note 142, at 92.
172 See Stephenson, supra note 9, at 447; see also Joint Press Statement, supra
note 170, para. 27.
173 See Economic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2, para. Al.
174 See AFTA Agreement, supra note 12, art. 5, para. A2.
175 Id. art. 5, para. C.
176 See Services Agreement, supra note 16, art. 1.
177 See IPR Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.
178 See Iustoms Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.
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integration within ASEAN has only just begun. None of the
provisions of these agreements, except those on tariff reduction,
have imposed specific legal obligations on member states, which
are still working on the recently set agenda. 179 It should also be
noted that the broad ASEAN goal has been officially called eco-
nomic cooperation, 180 not the establishment of a customs union
nor a common market.'1
8
Still, the fact that this list includes much more than border
measures is important. If the positive integration measures listed
above begin to be fully implemented, it will involve greater mag-
nitude of asset specificity. The theoretical prediction, based on
transaction cost analysis (involving asset specificity and the possi-
bility for opportunism) and supported by empirical evidence
comparing the EU and NAFTA, suggests that greater institution-
alization, both in legislation and DRM, will become necessary. 182
4.3.1.3. ASEANInstitutional Development in the 1990s
ASEAN institutions, especially the Secretariat and the DRM,
have already showed significant developments in the 1990s. It
was the greater emphasis on economic cooperation in the 1980s
179 For recent developments, seeJoint Press Statement, supra note 170;Joint
Press Statement, Eleventh Meeting of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council
(held Oct. 15, 1997) (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <http://www.aseansec.org/aem29/
eco acll.htm>.
-T80 See, e.g., Economic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 12, art. 1.
181 It is noteworthy that a recent document calls for"closer economic inte-
gration within ASEAN." See ASEAN Vision 2020 (visited Mar. 19, 1998)
< http://www.aseansec.org/summit/vision97.htm >.
182 In analyzing economic integration, a distinction between negative inte-
gration and positive integration is sometimes used. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note
57, at 865. These terms are defined as follows: "negative integration denotes the
removal of discrimination in national economic rules and policies under joint
and authoritative surveillance; positive integration refers to the transfer of pub-
lic market-rule-making and policy-making powers from the participating poli-
ties to the union-level." Jacques Pelkmans, The Institutional Economics of Euro-
pean Integration, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 49, at 318, 321. There is a simi-
lar distinction between deeper integration and shallow integration. Deeper in-
tegration refers to "integration that moves beyond the removal of border barri-
ers" and shallow integration is "trade liberalization." LAWRENCE, supra note
142, at 8. The exact relationship between the two distinctions is not clear; the
distinctions are not based on asset specificity or the possibility for opportun-
ism. In this Article, the concepts of positive integration and deeper integration
correspond to integration measures with larger magnitudes of asset specificity
and larger possibilities for opportunism.
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that made it necessary to restructure the organization of
ASEAN.'83 First, the Secretariat was significantly strengthened in
1992,184 the year that the AFTA Agreement and the Economic
Cooperation Agreement were signed. Since the ASEAN Secretar-
iat first came into existence in 1976, the staff members had been
nominated by a Contracting Party.8 8 Now, there is open re-
cruitment,18 6 and the number of professional staff members has
been increased. 18 7 The title of Secretary-General of the ASEAN
Secretariat was changed to Secretary-General of ASEAN.'88 The
authority of this position has been expanded by explicitly grant-
ing it an enlarged mandate to "initiate, advise, co-ordinate and
implement ASEAN activities." 189 Second, in late 1996, a new dis-
pute resolution mechanism was established, marking a clear de-
parture from an OECD type of cooperative forum without adju-
dication. In 1997, the additional post of Deputy Secretary-
General was created, and the sole responsibility of one of the two
Depu7 Secretary-Generals is AFTA and economic coopera-
tion.
This development is visually pictured in Figure 3 in the Ap-
pendix. When ASEAN was established in 1967, its location on
Figure 3 was exactly the same as NAFTA's. The ASEAN Decla-
ration provided for only National Secretariats. The creation of
the ASEAN Secretariat in 1976, represented a step along the hori-
zontal axis toward the OECD. In 1992, there was further move-
ment in this direction, and moved vertically to the present posi-
tion in 1996 when the DRM was introduced.
183 See Pelkmans, supra note 100, at 100.
184 See Protocol Amending the Agreement on the Establishment of the A SEAN
Secretariat (Restructuring of the ASEAN Secretariat), July 22, 1992 (visited Feb. 9,
1998) <http://www.asean.or.id/politics/prasec92.htm> [hereinafter Secretar-
iatAgreement].
15 See Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, Feb. 24,
1976, art. 4, para. 7 (visited Jan. 15, 1998) <http://www.asean.or.id/politics/
asec76.htm>.
186 See Secretariat Agreement, supra note 184, art. 4.
187 The staff has been increased from 14 to 35. See ASEANSecretariat, supra
note 101.
188 See Secretariat Agreement, supra note 184, art. 2.
189 Id. art. 3, para. 2(iv).
190 See Protocol Amending the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN
Secretariat, May 31, 1997 (-visited Jan. 15, 1998) <http://wwv.asean.or.id/
amm/agas97.htm >.
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This chronology fits the transaction cost theory. Until the
mid-1970s, the activities of ASEAN did not involve issues with
high magnitudes of asset specificity. Introduction of the PTA in
1977, following two major agreements19' that clarified ASEAN's
fundamental purpose, coincides with the creation of the ASEAN
Secretariat. However, it was not until the 1990s, when compre-
hensive economic cooperation measures were announced, that
ASEAN institutions were expected to play an important role in
decision-making as well as in dispute resolution. This process il-
lustrates the development of a more efficient institutional design
to better accommodate the expansion of transactions and transac-
tion costs.
4.3.2. Institutional Evolution for Further Economic
Integration Within ASEA N
Based on such recent development and previous prediction,
this section will speculate on the future institutional evolution by
looking at individual institutions of ASEAN.
4.3.2.1. The Role of the Secretariat
If the announced integration measures take off, the role of the
Secretariat will become more important. The Secretariat's greater
involvement in the areas of research, analysis, policy recommen-
dation, and the coordination of harmonization measures can sig-
nificantly reduce transaction costs, 192 and accelerate the creation
of a more complete body of law that prevents opportunism. Itwill • 93
will then push the integration forward. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to monitor the implementation and opportunistic behavior
of member states, and to help solve problems when questions
arise. 194
191 See Declaration of Concord, supra note 93; Treaty ofAmity and Coopera-
tion in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976 (visited Feb. 27, 1998)
< http://www.asean.or.id/summit/amity76.htm >.
19?Information provided by the Secretariat can be very important in en-
couraging transactions that are necessary for an efficient outcome. Asymmetry
of inforrmation among member states, may lead one member state to take ad-
vantage of the ignorance of others, resulting in inefficiency. Moreover, asym-
metry of information may hinder transactions simply because the member
states disagree about the value of that transaction. For examples about the role
of information between two firms, see HART, supra note 158, at 82, 87-88.
193 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 944.
194 See Trachtman, supra note 5, at 45.
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Recent agreements seem to share the same spirit in that they
have established the role of the Secretariat in monitoring the im-
plementation and the progress of those agreements.195  In addi-
tion, the Secretariat, whose obligations are defined as "Functions
and Powers" of the Secretary-General, must "initiate, advise, co-
ordinate and implement ASEAN activities" as well as perform
other obligations. 196 However, if the Secretariat undertakes such
responsibilities in full, it will be a massive project. A staff of
thirty-five professionals in the ASEAN Secretariat allocated to
1 97.four bureaus does not seem overwhelming, in comparison to a
staff of 500 in the WTO Secretariat 198 and 18,000 in the EU
Commission!'99 The next problem is how to design the Secretar-
iat so that it fulfills these responsibilities. To develop some image,
an immediate reference would be the Secretariat of the OECD,
which "actfs] as a catalyst, given its capacity for intellectual per-
suasion."
20 -
Furthermore, if we look at the EU, "[b]eyond its function as
an enforcement agency... the Commission participates in a vari-
ety of ways in the Community law-making process:"20' "The
'right of initiative,'" "[a]mendment of the Commission's pro-
posal," "[o]riginal legislative power," "[d]elegated legislation," and
"[e]xecutive powers."20 2 This far-reaching list is striking, but
many of the items are associated with the legislative authority of
the Council, the intergovernmental body of the EU.
195 See AFTA Agreement, supra note 12, art. 7, para. 3; Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement, supra note 12, art. 7.
196 Secretariat Agreement, supra note 184, art. 3, para. 2(iv).197 See ASEAN Secretariat, supra note 101.
198 See W'TO, About the WTO (visited Mar. 18, 1998)
< http://www.wto.org/htbin/htimage/wto/map.map?101,34 >.
19 See CRAIG & DE BfJRCA, supra note 61, at 43.
200 Pelkmans, supra note 100, at 101. However, he continues: "insofar as
ASEAN continues to focus on projects of development and/or economic or
other co-operation, the OECD example is of marginal relevance only, simply
because it does very little in this domain." Id. Nevertheless, the OECD seems
an eminent example for the purpose of economic integration. Left unanswered
is the question of how to design and relate these two different fields.
201 Jacobs & Karst, supra note 49, at 187.
202 Id. at 187-91 (listing the characteristics of the Commission).
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4.3.2.2. Defining and Refining Inter-governmental Bodies
A more fundamental problem lies at the decision-making
level. ASEAN has no detailed "constitutional" document compa-
rable to the Treaty of Rome. The ASEAN Declaration of 1967 is
just a brief document and provides very little with respect to in-
stitutional arrangement. Even with respect to the major inter-
governmental bodies at the ministerial level, the Heads of Gov-
ernment, the AMM, and the AEM, their exact functions and their
relations are hardly documented. Apparently, though, the legisla-
tive process is still based on the traditional treaty making process.
All the major agreements of the kind are negotiated by the head
of each government or its related ministers and do not take the
form of institutional legislation by ASEAN itself.
20 3
Such a procedure can delay the process of economic integra-
tion for the following reasons. First, the approval process of trea-
ties by the legislative body at a domestic level, depending on the
constitutional structure of each member state, may delay the204
process. Second, we can assume that further economic integra-
tion will increase the intergovernmental transaction to write
more contracts that entail more asset specificity, uncertainty, and
complexity. Such ministerial-level institutions will end up having
to function like a working-level body, like the Commission and
the Council in the EU combined. This is certainly not efficient.
After all, "[n]o regional group without the type of centralized de-
cision-making structure of the EC has yet been successful in fully
integrating separate sovereign state economic systems."205 Having
this general issue in mind, the individual issues will now be exam-
ined.
4.3.2.2.1. The Heads of Government
The Declaration of Concord of 1976 stated that "[m]eeting[s]
of the Heads of Government of the member states [will take
place] as and when necessary." 20 6  Some reforms took place in
203 Recent amendments to the Investment Agreement are interesting. The
official title of the initial agreement contained all of the member states, how-
ever, the individual state names were replaced by "ASEAN." It shows a devel-
opment toward legislation as ASEAN, rather than collective action of individ-
ual member states.
204 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 944.
205 Id. at 945.
206 Declaration of Concord, supra note 93.
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1992 by a declaration that provided that "ASEAN Heads of Gov-
ernment shall meet formally every three years with informal
meetings in between,"207 even though the ASEAN Heads of Gov-
ernment's specific role and constitutional constraint were not de-
fined.
This reform is certainly one form of institutionalization of the
Heads of Government. 208 From a legal standpoint, whether it is
stable or not is another matter. If such a high authority as the
Heads of Government is fully institutionalized under the frame-
work and constraint of the RIA, just as the people's right of
amendment of a constitution is institutionalized under the
framework and constraint of a constitution, it is likely to achieve
a stable state. Furthermore, if such an authority stays completely
outside of the RIA, it would also produce a stable state because it
could not do anything within the framework of the RIA. In con-
trast, when the Heads of Government is integrated into the RIA
without any internal constraint, which means it can do anything
within the framework of ASEAN, there is nothing that assumes
stability.
The development of the European Council sets a good prece-
dent to deal with the Heads of Government. The European
Council has held its meeting regularly since 1974 and has
"resolved difficult _political issues that the Council of Ministers
could not settle."2  There was no treaty reference until 1987,
when the Single European Act came into being. The Treaty on
European Union in 1992 "would mark an important step in the
European Council's integration into Community affairs." 210 It
provided that "[tihe European Council shall provide the Union
with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define
the general political guidelines thereof."21 It also provided that
"the Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or of
Government, shall, acting by a qualified majority,... decide
whether it is appropriate for the Community to enter the third
stage [of Monetary Union]."
212
207 Singapore Declaration, supra note 13, para. 8.
208 See Pelkmans, supra note 100, at 105.
209 BERmANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 55.
210 Id. at 56.
211 Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. D, 31
I.L.M. 247.
212 Id. art. 109j.3.
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We should notice the following points in this institutional de-
velopment. First, the ordinary legislative power has always been
retained within the framework of the Community, not the Euro-
pean Council. Second, as a consequence, the authority of the
European Council has been limited to set guidelines or to deal
with issues that cannot be resolved within the framework of the
Community. Third, integration of the European Council into
the Community facilitates "further transfer of sovereignty to the
Community. It therefore advances rather than slows the integra-
tion progress." 213 As a future issue for ASEAN, certain institu-
tional constraints on the Heads of Government, and clear and ef-
ficient allocation of legislative authority may be considered.
4.3.2.2.2. Relationship Between the AMM and the
AEM
The relationship between the AMM and the AEM is also not
very clear.214 For the purpose of improving ASEAN-level general
policy coordination, one obvious option is to integrate them un-
der one institutional umbrella.215 However, whether it is neces-
sarily desirable to do so is not so obvious.
It may rather delay the institutionalization of decision-making
for economic integration because political issues by their nature
exhibit very different transaction losses than economic issues.
Another potential issue lies in the fact that this option is to incor-
porate an economic issue into an inherently political regional ar-
rangement. It is the same type of challenge that the EU now faces
from the opposite side, which is trying to incorporate a political
issue into an inherently economic arrangement. Where economic
issues are already dealt with in a forum of foreign ministers (the
Council), incorporation of political issues does not seem peculiar.
Where political issues are dealt with in a forum of foreign minis-
ters (AMM), there is likely to be additional difficulty to incorpo-
rate economic matters, which have already been dealt with by the
economic ministers (AEM. Thus, while setting a clear division
of labor to avoid confusion in decision-making is essential, a hier-
archical structure involving these two bodies would be the future
213 BERMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 57.
214 "The AEM and AMM report jointly to the ASEAN Heads of Govern-
ment during an ASEAN Summit." ASEANSecretariat, supra note 101.
215 See Pelkmans, supra note 100, at 111.
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step. Until then, the best analogy would be the United Nations,
whose Security Council on one hand and whose Economic and
Social Council on the other, each operate under different rules
and procedures.
4.3.2.2.3. AEM and Its Legislative Role
Placing all aspects of economic cooperation under AEM su-
pervision, 16 and dissolving the five ASEAN Economic Commit-
tees in order to have SEOM handle the various aspects of eco-
nomic cooperation, was a significant improvement for economic
integration. It is an improvement in preventing the long con-
ceived institutional problem of "excessive decentralization of [the]
decision making process" concerning economic cooperation.
Such a problem could make it difficult for ASEAN to have clear,
long-run guidelines.
217
AFTA itself is overseen by the AFTA Council established by
the AEM.218 However, for our purpose we can focus on the
AEM rather than the AFTA Council, since "it will function un-
der the AEM in case of conflict," 21 9 and the AEM oversees eco-
nomic cooperation as a whole.
The next step for the AEM would be to assume institutional-
ized legislation authority with division of labor with the Secretar-
iat, similar to the Council in the EU, and to introduce a majority
voting system. The former boils down to the issue of domestic
allocation of power over ASEAN affairs, because such an institu-
tionalized legislative body composed of each member state may
no longer be able to be involved in legislation at the AEM.220 The
latter will generate the problem of transaction losses by losing
veto power under a consensus system. The due consequence of a
majority voting system is a democracy deficit, so the next chal-
lenge would be ASEAN Parliament. Recall that all of these
measures are designed to reduce transaction costs. The extent to
which ASEAN will foster institutionalization depends on the cal-
culation of transaction gains, which is a function of economic ties
216 See Economic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 12, at 508.
217 See Pelkmans, supra note 100, at 101.
218 See AFTA Agreement, supra note 12, art. 7, para. 1.
219 Pelkmans, supra note 100, at 125.
220 This is the original idea of institutionalization as discussed above. See
Abbott, supra note 115, at 944.
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within ASEAN, and conceived transaction losses, which are a
function of political will and mutual trust.
To predict how far this cooperation will go, a comparison
with the EU is useful. Compared with the EU, economic integra-
tion as seen by the amount of intra-regional trade is less in
ASEAN than in the EU.?2 ' Political will and mutual trust are
probably less strong in ASEAN than in the EU. This compara-
tive analysis leads us to a prediction that ASEAN will not go as
rapidly or as far as the EU in economic cooperation in the imme-
diate future. Therefore, we do not yet have to worry about the
future problems that will arise when the "President of ASEAN"
will state at his inauguration, "We are all Republicans; we are all
Federalists." 222 Such issues will include a democracy deficit, simi-
lar to the one the EU is currently facing, and the creation of insti-
tutional checks and balances, just like the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution did in order to limit the power of a majority.2 3
The transaction cost economizing point must be far below it but
probably more than the status quo. Immediate steps that can be
taken would be to consider an institutionalized legislation proc-
ess even without majority voting, just like that of the Council of
the OECD.
4.3.2.3. Dispute Resolution
Evaluation of the ASEAN DSM cannot preclude the difficulty
that comes from the fact that it apparently has never been used.
However, a comparison with other dispute resolution mecha-
nisms reveals the following potential issues in its move toward a
deeper economic integration.
At a glance, the ASEAN DSM is a short and simplified ver-
sion of the WTO DSU; the wording and the structure are almost
identical. However, there are two important differences. First,
SEOM makes rulings based on a simple majority without the par-
ticipation of the disputing parties, 24 not negative consensus,
where a panel report shall be adopted unless there is a consensus
not to adopt the report. Second, the AEM conducts appellate
221 See supra Section 4.1.
222 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 (1897).
223 See Jacobs & Karst, supra note 49, at 175-76.
224 See DSM, supra note 55, art. 7.
M See DSU, supra note 54, para. 16.
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review and makes decisions on the same basis as SEOM. These
leave more room for bargaining among member states, and there-
fore, will increase uncertainty in the reliability of agreements.
Another category of problems is the covered agreements of
the DSM. First, legislation that provides substantive rules on
which member states make claims against other member states
have yet to be developed. In this sense, the mere existence of the
DSM is nothing more than a paper tiger. Second, the DSM does
not apply generally within the framework of ASEAN, but rather
is accompanied by a long appendix that lists covered agreements.
In this respect, the DSM follows the form of the WTO and not
NAFTA's Chapter 20. 2 6 It will entail transaction costs to decide
whether an agreement should be covered while drafting an
agreement, but at the same time, it may encourage legislation by
allowing flexibility whether it is covered by the DRM.
It would be possible for ASEAN to adopt a panel system simi-
lar to the one in NAFTA's Chapter 19. The first thing to point
out is that NAFTA's Chapter 19 is a very special case, which is
introduced based on a subtle barpin over transaction losses and
transaction gains of the parties. Chapter 19 is also peculiar in
that the panel is expected to apply domestic laws, and not an in-
ternational agreement. However, the legal status of a ruling un-
der Chapter 19, by which panel reports replace domestic judicial
reviews, is an interesting phenomenon. Given the nature of har-
monization that relies on domestic institutions for implementa-
tion of a common legislation, the DRM has an important role of
setting up a uniform uideline for domestic courts. This is where• 28
supremacy comes in. As a practical matter, however, suprem-
acy may become an issue only after such common legislation has
been sufficiently developed.
226 "[T]he dispute settlement provisions of this Chapter shall apply with
respect to the avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the Parties regard-
ing the interpretation or application of this Agreement...." NAFTAsupra
note 56, art. 2004.
As far as the AD/CVD issue is concerned, it would be a simpler solu-
tion to ban the application of AD laws among the parties, just as the EU and
the Australia-New Zealand pact have done. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note
109, at 681.
228 See Taylor, supra note 57, at 896-97.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Methodology
If there is any unique contribution from this Article, it comes
from combining theoretical prediction with the use of a newly es-
tablished framework of empirical analysis. It has the following
advantages: First, empirical analysis facilitated testing of theoreti-
cal hypothesis and enabled us to make a theoretical prediction.
Second, the two-dimensional analysis enabled us to observe an
empirical correlation of two variables. It is a departure from con-
ventional typology of RIA229 in that it focuses specifically on in-
stitutionalization, and also in that it employed a two-dimensional
framework, in contrast to one-dimensional, to improve the qual-
ity of the analysis.
However, there are important weaknesses as well. First, there
was a salient difficulty in indexing degrees of institutionalization.
If the wrong parameters are picked to analyze these RIAs, the dia-
gram may lead us to the wrong analysis. Second, even if one
chose appropriate parameters, they are often continuous variables,
rather than discrete "yes or no" variables. In order to keep "yes
or no" policy for simplicity, precise definition of parameters is vi-
tal. Third, there are only a small number of sample cases,230
which is not enough to derive a general conclusion based on em-
pirical evidence. Fourth, analysis in this Article almost entirely
focused on the calculation of an RIA as a whole, and not calcula-
tions of the individual member states (except the bargain over
Chapter 19 between the U.S. and Canada) or individual sectors.
To make it more realistic, a model may be built incorporating the
differences in transaction economizing calculations of each state
and each sector.
22 See, e.g., Pelkmans, supra note 182, at 332.
230 We can increase the data set by employing time series data, as I partially
did with ASEAN, however, the sample size is still small. See supra Section
4.3.1.3. Generally speaking, this method entails a selection problem. If the in-
stitutional design at the time that we select as our sample is just a temporary
one or in the course of transformation, it becomes inappropriate to derive gen-
eral empirical trends from those samples. This is anaZogous to the advantage
and difficulty in dealing with pooled data. See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIEL L. RUDINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS
250-51 (4th ed. 1998).
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5.2. Findings and Their Limits
5.2.1. Relations Between Institutionalization in the DRM and
Legislation
In Section 4.2., this Article presented a theoretical predic-
tion231 and supporting empirical evidence that institutionalization
in the DRM and legislation tend to develop together. On the
other hand, this conclusion indicates that there are some cases that
deviate from this prediction under certain conditions. This gives
us an opportunity for analysis and prediction as to the institu-
tional design of other regional economic arrangements that are
currently being formed. But a small sample size is, as always, a
problem.
5.2.2. Prediction on ASEAN
The finding in this Article supported the prediction for fur-
ther institutionalization of ASEAN. Generally, ASEAN tends to
be viewed with either strong optimism or strong skepticism. This
may be natural because it is only a few years ago that ASEAN
formally began to move toward economic "integration," not just
"cooperation." Thus, it is still hard to predict what will happen
to ASEAN. This Article is intended to show a possibility of a
more analytical approach by integrating theory, empirical analy-
sis, and economic data. The major limits are, however, that the
analysis of this Article is primarily based on official documents
without evaluating their credibility. Therefore, the predictive
power of this analysis depends on the extent to which the an-
nounced future direction is actually realized.
5.2.3. How Should We Let the World Trading System Back In?
Beyond comparison of existing RIAs, we can think of various
RIAs with various institutional features by simply pointing to the
place on the diagram presented in Figure 3 in the Appendix. We
can analyze how plausible it is based on the theory and method
that this Article has developed, but we cannot analyze whether
they are good or not for the world trading system. In terms of
evaluating welfare effects and efficiency, "much depends on the
231 See Williamson, supra note 138, at 279.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'I Econ. L.
policies adopted," 2  and such an analysis is more for economists
than institutional analysts. As a legal matter, however, the analy-
sis of this Article does show that GATT's Article XXIV is not a
complete guideline because tariffs constitute only a small portion
of the various features of RIAs. RIAs that aim at deeper integra-
tion beyond tariff reduction leave much to be done from the side
of a world trading system.
232 LAWRENCE, supra note 142, at 33.
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APPENDIX
Table 1
parameter Institution Procedure Effect total
permanent composed of direct appellate initedpckkal binding 6
court judges adjudication procedure involvement effect
WTO * *7* 4
N-AFAai19 * * * * 5
NAF1AU _____ ____ ____ 0
, AS__AN * * 2
EU * * * * * * 6
reverse ad bo panel not limited consultation no appeal political only a basis
parameter toudges required involvement fbr solution
Table 2
parameter inter- bovernentalody secretariat parliament total
internal majority independence capacity to elected decision 6
constraints voting initiate re maese making
WTO *
NAFrA 0
ASEAN * * 2
EU * * * * * * 6
OECD * * 2
reverse nonelextemal not available dependent no initiative not available not available
en constraints on members I I I
Figure 1
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